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CHAPTER 8 
Methods of Ingenuity: The Renaissance 
Tradition behind Descartes’s Regulae 
Richard J. Oosterhoff 
 
 
In the middle of Rule IV of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, 
the rule where he famously invokes a mathesis universalis, 
Descartes says: 
I persuade myself that certain first seeds of truths, sown in 
human ingenia by nature, which we extinguish in ourselves 
by daily reading and hearing various errors—that such 
powers existed in that primitive and pure antiquity. Thus by 
the same light of the mind that let them see, without 
knowing why, that virtue should be preferred over pleasure 
and the noble over utility; by this light they also knew the 
true ideas of Philosophy and Mathematics, even though 
they could not yet pursue those sciences completely.1 
Descartes is a wiley interpreter of the textual tradition. Like any 
good humanist, he signals his knowledge of antiquity, praising 
the ancients as ‘great ingenia’ whose mental power was primal 
and vigorous. Yet as a talented emulator—not imitator—of those 
ancients, he also demonstrates that he has not learned too much 
from these models. He accepts no content from them, but only 
takes up the order of their inquiry as he begins his mental 
exercises with mathematics. A few lines later Descartes observes 
that the ancients were committed to mathematics because it 
offered a powerful method, while he criticizes them for having 
cunningly hidden the details. 
	
1 AT X, p. 376: ‘Sed mihi persuadeo, prima quaedam veritatum semina 
humanis ingeniis a natura insita, quae nos quotidie tot errores diversos 
legendo et audiendo, in nobis extinguimus, tantas vires in rudi ista et pura 
antiquitate habuisse, ut eodem mentis lumine, quo virtutem voluptati, 
honestumque utili praeferendum esse videbant, etsi quare hoc ita esset, 
ignorarent, Philosophiae etiam et Matheseos veras ideas agnoverint, 
quamvis ipsas scientias perfecte consequi nondum possent.’ In the next line 
Descartes finds these ‘true traces’ in Pappus and Diophantus. All translations 
my own unless otherwise stated. 
In Rule IV Descartes alludes to many characteristics of a good 
method. First, he focuses on the inborn powers of the mind that 
the term ingenium denotes.2 Second is immediate intuition: he 
finds his way to the ancients, not through their doctrines, but 
through their experience of the light of the mind. In fact, the rule 
itself is a performance of Descartes’s own method: analysis into 
simple intuitions, then ordering and enumerating them to make 
chains of inference—a procedure which texts and talk simply 
corrupt. 
Yet Descartes is just as coy about his recent sources as he is 
with the ancients. One would never guess that in the Regulae 
Descartes takes on a pedagogical genre that was reasonably well 
established by the late sixteenth century. Moreover, in this 
Renaissance genre of textbook methods many of Descartes’s 
moves are commonplaces. I argue that the same Cartesian 
method which promises a mathesis universalis also taps into 
humanist pedagogical practices, where ‘method’ is a tool of 
invention that straddled the line between bodily technique and 
mental procedure: exercitationes ingenii. My argument parallels 
the now-orthodox view that Renaissance natural history—
whether Aldrovandi’s collecting of observations or Jean Bodin’s 
Theatrum or Francis Bacon’s histories—grew out of humanist 
practices of commonplacing learned in school.3 Cartesian 
conceptual method, like the new natural history, depended on 
Renaissance school practices. Some studies have made steps in 
this direction, setting Descartes’s Regulae in the context of 
Renaissance encyclopaedic aims, but they have tended to 
	
2 On the semantic field of ingenium, see the chapter in this volume by Igor 
Agostini, as well as the monograph by Alexander Marr, Raphaële Garrod, 
José Ramon Marcaida, and Richard Oosterhoff, Logodaedalus: Word 
Histories of Ingenuity in Early Modern Europe (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 2018). 
3 See especially the classic studies of Ann Blair, “Humanist Methods in Natural 
Philosophy: The Commonplace Book,” Journal for the History of Ideas, 53.4 
(1992), pp. 541–51; Ann Blair, The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and 
Renaissance Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). For 
natural history, this has become a dominant paradigm: e.g. Fabian Krämer, 
Ein Zentaur in London: Lektüre und Beobachtung in der frühneuzeitlichen 
Naturforschung (Affalterbach: Didymos-Verlag, 2014); Richard Yeo, 
Notebooks, English Virtuosi, and Early Modern Science (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2014). Bacon’s dependence on the tradition was already 
signalled by the pioneering study of Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery 
and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). 
compare the Regulae with particular projects.4 My point is not 
that Descartes deliberately took a position within an established, 
highly theoretical debate—though that may be true. Rather, I 
wish to suggest that we take account of a much broader range of 
texts and practices. In the Regulae Descartes assembles parts of 
a simple pedagogical genre that by the early seventeenth 
century was omnipresent, even taken for granted, as the basis 
for learning. 
Ingenium is the lens that should draw our eye to the space 
Descartes shared with this pedagogical tradition. My account of 
it will be in two parts: first I survey the genre in necessarily stark 
outline, and then I briefly consider the question of mathematics 
and method. 
1 The Manuals of Method 
Ingenium featured as a crucial, if imprecisely used, term in the 
countless Renaissance handbooks on educational method. 
Humanist pedagogues were acutely sensitive to their ingenium 
or innate powers and how these might be moulded. They were 
thus preoccupied with the same conundrum that runs through 
Descartes’s Regulae: how much of learning depends on the 
student’s own ingenuity, and how much relies on an art one can 
learn? No one knew better than teachers of the new style of 
humanism such as Pier Paolo Vergerio how much depended on a 
student’s raw material. His own De ingenuis moribus et 
liberalibus adolescentie studiis (ca. 1400–1402) began with a 
guide for determining ‘the signs of a liberal ingenium’ (signa 
liberalis ingenii), such as curiosity, keenness for praise, and love 
	
4 Paolo Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory: The Quest for a Universal 
Language, trans. Stephen Clucas (1983; London: Continuum, 2000), pp. 123–
28, on enumeration in the Regulae; Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Topica 
universalis: eine Modellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker 
Wissenschaft (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), pp. 293–97; Nelly Bruyère, Méthode 
et dialectique dans l’œuvre de La Ramée: Renaissance et âge classique 
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1984), pp. 385–94; André Robinet, Aux sources de l’esprit 
cartésien: l’axe La Ramée-Descartes—de la “Dialectique” des 1555 aux 
“Regulae” (Geneva: Vrin, 1996); Édouard Mehl, Descartes en Allemagne: 
1619–1620 (Strasbourg: Presses Univ. de Strasbourg, 2001). And see now 
the exemplary study of Claus Zittel, Theatrum philosophicum: Descartes und 
die Rolle ästhetischer Formen in der Wissenschaft (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
2009). 
of glory.5 As Battista Guarino put it in his widely read account of 
his father’s teaching methods (1459), the desire to learn arises 
spontaneously as ‘something a teacher cannot give them from 
the outside’.6 
Such handbooks therefore balanced what nature bestowed 
with techniques for channelling and developing those natural 
gifts. To consider nature, some turned to natural philosophy and 
nature’s maker for help in characterising ingenia. A popular 
version was Maffeo Vegio’s De educatione (1445–1448), which 
centred on the example of Augustine’s mother Monica, since the 
mother influences a child’s nature in the most profound ways: 
for physicians say that the force is so impressed that the 
seed has the causes and conditions when it establishes 
generative roots; what the seed pours into human bodies 
and ingenia will never be washed away.7 
Vegio drew on common medical wisdom, sharing territory with 
books of women’s secrets on how to make strong babies, 
framing education in naturalistic terms, and including advice on 
medicines for the body. 
As manuals of technique, such books supplied arts to sharpen, 
augment, restrain, and prompt one’s ingenium. Of course, the 
best way to deal with a given ingenium was to buy the book and 
hire its author to teach your children; writers like Erasmus 
typically addressed their wise words to youths, but dedicated 
them to parents and other prospective patrons who could pay.8 
	
5 Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus ac liberalibus studiis, in Humanist 
Educational Treatises, ed. by Craig W. Kallendorf (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), pp. 9–15. More generally, see David Robey, 
“Humanism and Education in the Early Quattrocento: The De ingenuis 
moribus of P. P. Vergerio,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 42.1 
(1980), pp. 27–58. 
6 Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Kallendorf, Humanist 
Education Treatises, p. 262: ‘Ut quam eis praeceptor extrinsecus tradere non 
potest discendi cupiditatem.’ 
7 Maffeo Vegio, De educatione liberorum (Paris, 1511), cap. 1.3 (fol. 7r): 
‘quam certe ita tenacem imprimi medici tradunt, ut quas rationes 
conditionesque semen habuerit dum generationis radices iacit, easdem 
infundat nunquam abluendas in humana corpora atque ingenia.’ 
8 Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, “Humanism and the School of Guarino: A 
Problem of Evaluation,” Past & Present, 96 (1982), pp. 51–80; Anthony 
Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and 
the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: 
Since the goal of education was to make skilled bookmen, 
Erasmus and his colleagues offered bookish techniques: they 
offered lists of books, handbooks of proverbs and quotations, 
and rules for spelling and developing an abundant Latin style—
such books of advice were widely printed and imitated. But such 
bookish advice often turned out, especially in the fifteenth and 
early sixteenth century, to be about bodies. While offering 
schemes for managing information, such handbooks also offered 
stock medical advice for managing one’s body and mind. In a 
genre of handbooks known as ‘arts of memory’, authors 
captured rules for ameliorating forgetfulness, for making the 
most of your ingenium. The stock examples are found in 
Giovanni Michele Alberto da Carrara’s recipe for ‘oil of 
philosophers’ and his diet of ginger, anacardina, and rhubarb, all 
intended to help the memory. Such remedies for the 
beleaguered scholar also fill Marsilio Ficino’s bestselling De vita 
triplici (1489), an elaborated compendium of techniques for 
manipulating one’s ingenium.9 
Central to these how-to books for would-be scholars is the 
notion of exercitationes ingenii, practices that join bodily care to 
mental procedures. As Descartes said in the Regulae, the 
challenge was not merely understanding, but remembering. 
Carrara’s version began with the importance of memory, which 
suggested he thought of all his rules for developing the ingenium 
as a matter of such exercise: 
For the studious, it is easy to read many things, it is good to 
understand many things, and this is not difficult to a well-
trained ingenium. However, to gather these things and keep 
them in the box of one’s memory so that they do not ebb 
away, is a necessary and preeminent good of human life.10 
	
Harvard University Press, 1986). The fine words about the ennobling 
potential of education to elevate souls were certainly an exercise in self-
promotion—but that fact does not preclude serious intellectual intent. 
9 On the editions of the book see Marsilio Ficino, Three Books on Life, ed. and 
trans. Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark (Tempe, Arizona: Medieval & 
Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1989), pp. 8–9. 
10  Michele Alberto da Carrara, De omnibus ingeniis augendae 
memoriae (Bologna, 1491), sig. a1r: ‘Nam multa legere studiosis facile, multa 
quoque intelligere bono, atque exercitato ingenio non difficile est. Verum ea 
congerere, et in scrinio memorie conservare ita, ut non effluant, necessarium 
ac precipuum est humane vite bonum.’ Cf. Pliny, Historia naturalis, 24. 
A little further down the page, Carrara adapted the usual source 
for thinking about exercitationes ingenii, namely Cicero’s 
instructions on memory in the Rhetorica ad Herennium. Cicero 
had taught how to construct vivid images according to a natural 
order, ‘in which the ingenium cannot be confused in 
enumerating’ the series of things to be remembered.11 Guarino’s 
De ordine docendi et studendi linked Cicero’s comments on the 
arts of memory with note-taking practices. He wrote that 
students should rewrite what they had learned ‘as if they were 
about to teach it’. Guarino advised students to review their day’s 
notes each night, a practice Cicero had called Pythagorean: 
‘These are the exercises of the ingenium; these are the 
racetracks of the mind’.12 Among humanists, the exercitationes 
ingenii became a kind of short hand for the bodily care and 
scholarly practices that underwrote the Republic of Letters, often 
summed up in the phrase of Sallust, ‘no one exercised their 
ingenium without a body’.13 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, these practices were 
absorbed into the new fashion of method. For the medieval 
schoolmen, method had been defined within the context of 
logic. In the most widely used logic textbook of the medieval 
university, Peter of Spain equivocated on the notion of 
methodus: was it simply another word for scientia, or was it 
rather the knower’s stance or ‘habitus’ of knowledge?14 
Humanists like Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples rehabilitated an older 
tradition. The one occurrence of methodus in early Latin was in 
	
11  Carrara, De omnibus ingeniis augendae memoriae, sig. a5r: 
‘Nam hunc ordinem ipsa natura porrexit, neque confundi in eis enumerandis 
ingenium potest.’ 
12  Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist 
Educational Treatises, ed. by Craig W. Kallendorf (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), p. 296, quoting Cicero, De senectute, 38: 
‘Pythagoreorumque more, extendae memoriae gratia quid quod die dixerim, 
audiverim, egerim, commemoro vesperi. Hae sunt exercitationes ingenii; haec 
curricula mentis sunt.’ 
13  Sallust, The War with Catiline, §8: ‘Ingenium nemo sine 
corpore exercebat.’ 
14  Commentators on Peter of Spain or Jean Buridan normally 
dealt with the first line of the Summule, which paraphrased the first line of 
Aristotle’s Topica: ‘Dialectica est ars artium [et] scientia scientiarum ad omnium 
methodorum principia viam habens.’ (Dialectic is the art of arts and science of 
sciences, possessing the path to the principles of all method). Compare the 
opening lines of introductions to logic by Pierre Tataret, Johannes de Monte, 
and George of Brussels. 
the first line of Boethius’ translation of Aristotle’s Topica. In his 
commentary, Lefèvre glossed this instance of methodus 
differently than the medieval schoolmen had done: 
μἐθοδος properly means ‘pathway’, and is applied to a 
compendious area of instruction. Aristotle rightly calls his 
disciplines [i.e. books on each field of study] by this name. 
For they are very brief, quickly leading us to the 
understanding of the matter they deal with.15 
Here a methodus is an introductory textbook, an object that 
orders thought, rather than a conceptual structure or procedure. 
Over the next century, the definition of methodus (from the 
Greek ‘μετ᾽ ὁδος’) as per via brevi—quite literally, a ‘short cut’—
made methodus one of the most common titles in Renaissance 
textbooks.16 Methodus is found 25 times in Descartes’s Regulae, 
several times more than technical terms of logic such as judicium 
[10 times], dispositio [3], enuntiatio, [3], or syllogismus [5].17 
This expanding genre of materially brief books shared goals 
with conceptual rules: both were exercitationes ingenii, designed 
to strengthen and ameliorate one’s innate mental powers. 
Material and mental rules come together in a prosthetic genre 
that historians of the Renaissance have in the last two decades 
come to see as a fundamental piece of early modern intellectual 
furniture, namely the art of commonplacing.18 Constructing lists 
of knowns, establishing their natural or most useful order, and 
disposing them for use was seen as a note-taking practice that 
aided the ingenium. The lawyer Matteo Gribaldi made this point 
	
15  Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, Libri logicorum ad archteypos 
recogniti cum novis ad litteram commentariis (Paris: Hopyl & Estienne, 1503), 
fol. 229r: ‘μἐθοδος semitam proprie significat, transsumitur ad compendiariam 
disciplinam, quo nomine suas jure vocat Aristoteles disciplinas. Sunt enim 
brevissime, et cito nos ad rei de qua sunt ducentes cognitionem.’ 
16  Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 233–35; Walter J. Ong, Ramus, 
Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of 
Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958). 
17  Bruyère, Méthode et dialectique, p. 387. 
18  Outstanding works are Blair, “Humanist Methods in Natural 
Philosophy”; Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of 
Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Ann Blair, Too Much to 
Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010); Yeo, Notebooks, English Virtuosi, and Early 
Modern Science. 
in his treatise De methodo ac ratione studendi libri tres (On the 
Method and Rationale for Study): 
The ingenium will be greatly exercised by commonplaces, 
and the memory is helped a great deal by the seats of the 
subject matter. For indeed what art or discipline requires 
the sharpness of ingenium and the faculty for civility so 
much [as law]?19 
He concluded with the thought that: 
therefore it is a great aid to the ingenium, for unless some 
kind of brief method directs it to the doorsteps of truth it 
easily falls victim to novelty.20 
For Gribaldi, method kept a novice from straying into novelty. 
Method was a tool of discovery in the sense that it set out a 
discipline for use, structuring knowledge that already existed, 
enabling the ingenium to discover quickly the concepts and 
phrases needed to compose a text. According to the vocabulary 
with which Descartes would toy, Gribaldi’s method was a means 
for disciplined invention without novelty within the particular 
domain of law.21 
In the second half of the sixteenth century, however, ‘method’ 
was increasingly expected to perform the logical trick of ordering 
all knowledge, even making space for future, new knowledge.22 
We can trace the growing responsibilities of method for directing 
the ingenium in examples from three of the most influential 
intellectual movements of the century: first, the new German 
	
19  Matteo Gribaldi, De methodo ac ratione studendi libri tres 
(Lyon, 1556), pp. 129–30: ‘Locis communibus ingenium maxime exercetur, a 
materiarum sedibus memoria plurimum adjuvatur. Enim vero quae ars seu 
disciplina ingenii acrimoniam aeque desiderat, at [c]ivilis facultas, in qua de 
justitiae partibus, humanam societatem conservantibus tractatur?’ 
20  Gribaldi, De methodo, p. 130: ‘Tunc ingenio maxime opus 
est, quod nisi brevi quodam methodo ad veritatis limina derigetur, facile in tali 
novitate succumberet.’  
21  Inventio was the first part of classical rhetoric manuals that 
the Greeks called τἐχναι. On some sixteenth-century uses of the term, see 
Alexander Marr and Vera Keller, eds., The Nature of Invention, a special issue of 
Intellectual History Review 24:3 (2014). 
22  On the growing need for knowledge schemes to find places 
for future discoveries, see Vera Keller, Knowledge and the Public Interest, 
1575–1725 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
universities which built on the teaching of Philipp Melanchthon; 
second, Peter Ramus, who found devoted followers in England 
and Germany; and finally the Jesuits, who offered a Catholic 
response to these movements. 
First, the Melanchthonians. The great pedagogue himself 
wrote several handbooks on rhetoric and dialectic.23 Although he 
never called these ‘methods’, over time he placed an increasing 
weight on dialectic as the site of invention, the finding and 
ordering of commonplaces (loci communes). This process of 
invention was relevant for training the ingenium. His mature 
version, the Erotemata dialectices, ‘written so it can usefully be 
set for pupils’, was first published in 1547 and widely republished 
with an opening letter that discussed how crucial the ars 
dialecticae was for training the lumen naturale (natural light) and 
the vis naturae (power of nature) of youthful ingenia, lest they 
become ingeniosi (subtle, sophistical minds) tangled in spurious 
arguments.24 
Melanchthon’s legacy was made explicitly methodical by one 
of the most productive of his students, the Danish theologian 
Niels Hemmingsen,25 whose earliest publication De methodis libri 
duo (1578) likely captures his experience at Wittenberg between 
1537 and 1542, around the same time. The book offers a 
compendium of approaches to method—it will serve us as a 
snapshot of options available by the mid- sixteenth century and 
therefore is worth a few paragraphs here. The preface situates 
Hemmingsen’s method among the handbooks for students, and 
without naming the ingenium alludes to the divine spark that 
draws studious youths (studiosae juventutes) to study, ‘for how 
does the man who does not seek, follow, and love quickness in 
learning and the path of teaching, differ from a beast?’26 Then 
immediately the definition: 
	
23  An overview of this development is given by Peter Mack, A 
History of Renaissance Rhetoric 1380–1620 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), pp. 106–22. 
24  Philipp Melanchthon, Erotemata dialectices, continentia 
fere integram artem, ita scripta, ut juventuti utiliter proponi possint ([1547] 
Frankfurt, 1550), sig. α2r–6r. 
25  A basic outline of Hemmingsen’s life is found in D. Albert 
Hauck, ed., Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 3rd ed. 
(Leipzig, 1899), VII, pp. 659–62. 
26  Niels Hemmingsen, De methodis libri duo, quorum prior 
quidem omnium methodorum universalium et particularium, quarum usus est in 
Philosophia, brevem ac dilucidam declarationem: posterior vero Ecclesiasten 
sive methodum theologicam interpretandi concionandique continet (Leipzig, 
What is method? A way of teaching by certain reasoning. 
That is, method is the mode of teaching by which 
prompting and leading each single thing is located, as it is 
explained, in the appropriate and fitting place.27 
Methods, he goes on, come in two kinds: particular method, 
which deals with a specific discipline; and universal method, 
which is appropriate to any art. Of these, his universal method is 
the most interesting for us, as it suggests the ambitions for 
universal knowledge that would characterize Descartes’s own 
reflections on method. 
Hemmingsen’s universal method involves two modes 
increasingly discussed at the time: synthesis and analysis. He 
observes that the word ‘synthesis’ comes from the mathematical 
mode of demonstration, leading from simpler statements to 
more complex conclusions. 
As a result, this method of synthesis proceeds from 
principles and the elements of things, which are easier and 
better known to the intellect, until it concludes at the end.28 
Yet the breadth of this approach extends far beyond 
mathematics; Hemmingsen claims that this definition applies to 
grammar, Aristotle’s Categories and Politics, Euclid’s Geometry, 
as well as Lombard’s Sentences in theology. The second mode of 
analysis, Hemmingsen explains, similarly denotes a mathematical 
mode of demonstration, but proceeds in the opposite direction: 
	
1578), p. 1: ‘Quid enim quaeso homo iste a bruto differt, qui discendi 
promptitudinem ac docendi viam non studiose quaerit, sectatur, amat?’ On the 
following page (p. 2), he notes that the light of methodically observing the 
order of things removes their difficulty: ‘et quemadmodum lumen in obscurum 
locum illatum tenebras pellit, ita ordinis recta observatio, difficultatem, quae 
alioqui in rebus existeret, tollit.’ (and just as a light brought into a dark place 
drives away the shadows, so correct, orderly observation removes the difficulty 
which otherwise would exist in things.) 
27  Hemmingsen, De methodis, p. 3: ‘Quid est methodus? 
Methodus est via docendi certa cum ratione, hoc est, methodus est ratio 
docendi, cuius admonitu, et ductu, singula in rerum explicatione aptis et 
accommodatis locis collocantur.’ 
28  Hemmingsen, De methodis, pp. 5–6: ‘Ita haec universalis 
Synthesis a principiis et elementis rerum progreditur, quae sunt intellectu 
faciliora et notiora, donec ad finem pervenerit.’ 
Analysis is the return from posterior statements to the 
principles and causes out of which they were constructed. 
That is, analysis is the ascent from the end [of the 
argument] back to the principle, and its principle is the 
conclusion that had been the end of synthesis.29 
He draws on examples of analysis increasingly important to 
debates about method, including mathematics, Galen’s writings 
on method, and the syllogistic reasoning of Aristotle’s Prior and 
Posterior Analytics.30 
The bulk of Hemmingsen’s book applies these universal 
methods to particular cases. One case especially is worth taking 
up here, because it connects analysis to enumeratio, a key 
operation for Descartes. The first rule of Hemmingsen’s 
enumeratio is to break the object of study down to its minimal 
parts, for example dividing ‘man’ first into body and soul, then 
into the various parts of the soul and members of the body, and 
finally into the various kinds of matter that make up a human 
body. Then one can apply the rules of enumeratio, which 
Hemmingsen envisions as a verbal process that begins with 
matching things (minimal parts) to words through their ‘natural 
signification.’31 By enumerating or picking up those words in 
proper sequence, one can construct ‘stronger arguments’ that 
demonstrate the matter at hand. 
Analysis, picking words apart from things and other words, 
takes a certain intuition—immediacy mattered to Hemmingsen 
too. Alongside synthesis and analysis, he identified a third form 
of method, diaeresis, the dichotomous division of a domain into 
two. Although Hemmingsen defines diaeresis as a third universal 
method, he also identifies it with a particular version of analysis. 
Yet he also sees diaeresis as a distinct method because certain 
people especially promoted it as such, with distinct goals. 
Different scholars prefer different methods, he notes, and 
	
29  Hemmingsen, De methodis, p. 10: ‘Analysis est ex 
posterioribus recursus ad principia et causas, ex quibus quae effecta sunt 
constitutionem habent. Hoc est, Analysis est ascensus a fine ad principium, 
cuius principium conclusio illa est, quae fuerat finis in Synthesi.’ 
30  For an overview of these sources, see Gilbert, Renaissance 
Concepts of Method, chapters 1 and 2. 
31  Hemmingsen assumes that words, when invented, originally 
displayed a natural link between res and vox: ‘Est enim naturalis significatio, 
quam primum habuit vox cum inventa est. Naturalia enim dicuntur, quae cum 
unoquoque nata sunt’ (De methodis, p. 37). 
some prefer analysis and diaeresis to synthesis for the 
reason that they think it more apt to the ingenia of men … 
since they lead the students back to the principles and 
sources. I cannot disapprove.32 
Hemmingsen here was thinking about Peter Ramus, with 
whom dichotomous method is most often associated, identifying 
the promise that earned Ramus droves of avid followers: the 
promise of a method that would take them right to the principles 
of nature. Hemmingsen clearly approves of this goal, but also 
seems uncertain how to teach a method so dependent on 
immediate, intuitive procedures. 
In fact, Ramus founded his whole project on the pedagogical 
view of the ingenium. This is the starting point in his first, 
inflammatory account of a new method in the Dialecticae 
institutiones (1543). The book opens with the claim that dialectic 
is a ‘power’ (vis) of the ingenium. His is a ‘natural dialectic’, in 
which the inborn nature of the human mind warrants the 
reliability of its notions: 
Belonging to man, and born with him, is a natural dialectic, 
that is ingenium, reason, mind, image of God the parent of 
all things, and finally the light emulating that happy and 
eternal light.33 
The details of this natural dialectic are admittedly tricky to pin 
down, all the more because Ramus reworked his method 
repeatedly. The overarching role of dialectic was rooted in 
nature, he said, but refined in teaching (doctrina) and worked 
	
32  Hemmingsen, De methodis, p. 20: ‘Alii Analysin et Diaeresin 
praeferunt Synthesi, eo quod ingeniis hominum aptius esse judicant … donec ad 
principia et fontes ipsos discentes deduxerint. Tametsi autem haec improbare 
non possum.’ If Hemmingsen could not disapprove Ramus, neither did he 
approve; see pp. 20–1: ‘Nec audiendum esse judico Ramum, virum alioqui 
doctum et bonum, qui unam tantum universalem Methodum agnoscit, nimirum 
platonicam: pugnat enim non solum cum Aristotele quem ipse contemnit, 
verumetiam cum natura et experientia.’ (Nor do I think we should listen to 
Ramus, a man otherwise learned and good, who only knows one universal 
method, no doubt the Platonic one; for not only does he fight with Aristotle, 
whom he condemns himself, but also with nature and experience.). 
33  Peter Ramus, Dialecticae institutiones (Paris, 1543), fol. 6r: 
‘naturalis autem dialectica, id est, ingenium, ratio, mens, imago parentis 
omnium rerum Dei, lux denique beatae illius et aeternae lucis aemula, hominis 
propria est, cum eoque nascitur.’ 
out in practice (exercitatio).34 Ramus here assembles a method 
out of the Ciceronian exercitationes ingenii common to the 
educational tradition. But Ramus added the sense of utility: 
exercitatio produced useful works (opera), applying knowledge 
to work in the world. 
While nature provided the basic principles, method was 
responsible for ordering the matter into knowledge. The first 
part of Ramus’ own method lies close to what Hemmingsen 
called analysis. As we might expect from Melanchthon and 
Hemmingsen, the ingenium played a role in the immediate 
intuition of the order of things. In this first procedure—
traditionally called invention—one analysed complex wholes into 
simple constituent principles. 
But Ramus added a second key procedure, what he called 
‘second judgment’ or disposition. After invention has summed 
up the collection of minimal parts (i.e. the elements of 
syllogisms), second judgment ‘provides the collocation and 
ordering of many and various arguments cohering to one 
another and linked as by an unbroken chain so as to lead to one 
certain end’.35 It is this procedure, recollecting the simple 
principles through enumeration, that Ramus would develop as 
the most distinctive feature of his method. And Ramus framed 
this procedure of second judgment within topoi of ingenuity, 
notably finding its origins in the inventive Prometheus and 
thereby suggesting that the very capacity to order mentally is a 
divine gift.36 
	
34  Ramus, Dialecticae, fol. 5v: ‘Comparatur igitur dialectica, 
sicuti vis artium reliquarum, natura, doctrina, exercitatione’. Here Ramus drew 
on the standard triad of natura-doctrina-exercitatio, inherited from Cicero, 
Quintilian and presumably the Greek rhetorical tradition they transmitted. See 
Kambouchner in this volume. 
35  Ramus, Dialecticae, fol. 27r: ‘Secundus [judicii gradus] 
collocationem tradit, et ordinem multorum, et variorum argumentorum 
cohaerentium inter se, et perpetua velut catena vinctorum, ad unumque 
certum finem relatorum: cuius dispositionis partes duae principes sunt, 
definitio, distributioque. Res enim primum universa definienda et explananda, 
deinde in partes diducenda est.’ Cf. Ong, Ramus, Method, p. 187, who 
translates certus finis as ‘determined’, inferring that this means 
‘predetermined’. But the inference may be coloured by Ong’s polemic against 
Ramus. The word ‘certain’ could just mean that the end is arrived at by a 
reliable chain of inferences. 
36  The Promethean origins of second judgment are mentioned 
at Ramus, Dialecticae, fol. 27v; see also Ramus, Animadversiones Aristotelicae 
(Paris, 1543), fol. 73v. 
Ramus’ method remained vague in specifics. Yet it boasted 
tremendous ambitions: on the one hand, a universal system of 
knowledge; on the other hand, a radically simplified procedure 
for obtaining that knowledge, rendering it clearer and more 
immediate to knowers. The attractiveness of these promises can 
be measured from the growing number of books—whether or 
not directly responding to Ramus—which offered schematic or 
tabular approaches to all knowledge. The massive number of 
such ‘methods’ has been widely documented.37 
The Society of Jesus offered a third, different approach that 
gave institutional weight to a culture of ingenuity. Concern about 
both method and the ingenium permeate the whole Jesuit 
programme of education.38 The final version of the Ratio 
studiorum of 1599 already bears the imprint of this language, not 
only in its title and lists of regulae, but also in its specifics. 
Indeed, the first rule for a professor of philosophy is that his 
ingenium should be well ordered.39 Teachers of the elementary 
classes were encouraged to hold ‘special exercises’ 
(exercitationes extraordinariae), ‘in order to cultivate ingenia 
and not merely to exercise the memory’.40 
For a teaching society like the Jesuits, the care of souls was 
also a cultura ingeniorum, in the phrase of the influential 
Antonio Possevino. He was well aware of the lengthy gestation 
of the Ratio studiorum, acting as its first historian in the preface 
to the three large folio volumes of his Bibliotheca selecta (1593). 
Possevino’s work reflects on the structure of the Jesuit cycle of 
	
37  The massive bibliography of editions directly linked to 
Ramus was largely collected by Walter J. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958). On the wider phenomenon of 
books composed as branching tables relating to Ramus, see Steffen Siegel, 
Tabula: Figuren der Ordnung um 1600 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2009). 
38  See Garrod in this volume. More generally on Jesuit 
education, see Gabriel Codina Mir, Aux sources de la pédagogie des jésuites. Le 
“Modus parisiensis” (Institutum Historicum S. I., 1968); Aldo D. Scaglione, The 
Liberal Arts and the Jesuit College System (Amsterdam ; Philadelphia: J. 
Benjamin, 1986); Antonella Romano, La Contre-Réforme mathématique: 
constitution et diffusion d’une culture mathématique jésuite a la Renaissance 
(1540–1640) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1999). 
39  Georg Michael Pachtler, ed., Ratio studiorum et 
institutiones scholasticae Societatis Jesu per Germaniam olim vigentes collectae 
concinnatae, Monumenta Germaniae Paedagogica (Berlin: A. Hofmann & Co., 
1887), p. 328. 
40  Pachtler, ed., Ratio studiorum, p. 378ff. Rule 32: 
‘Extraordinariae exercitationes (et publica specimina) utilitatem magnam 
habent … ut non memoria solum discipulorum, sed ingenium etiam excolatur.’ 
studies. It presents itself as a methodus, though not in the 
analytical fashion of Hemmingsen or Ramus. Instead, Possevino 
cited Jean Bodin’s Methodus ad faciliorem cognitionem historiae 
(1566) as a rival.41 Possevino presented the whole of knowledge 
as a history: he began with divine history, moving through 
Creation and the history of God’s people Israel in deep antiquity, 
to the philosophies of the Greeks, finally to the medicine and law 
of the Romans, which brought him, in stepwise fashion, to the 
modern day. The ‘method’ of all this knowledge consisted partly 
in its chronological ordering, but also in a description of the basic 
parts of knowledge in each discipline. Most importantly, then, 
Possevino’s method consisted in a massive, critical, and 
systematically arranged bibliography.42 
Though very different from Ramist analysis, Possevino’s vast 
method nevertheless began with care of the ingenium.43 The 
book’s first page promises a ‘certain rationale’, or ‘brief’ and 
‘easy’ exercises for directing ‘better wits’ (ingenia meliora).44 In 
fact, the first part of the Bibliotheca is the lengthy Cultura 
ingeniorum, a treatise that was reprinted and translated on its 
own several times. In the first chapters, Possevino addresses the 
diversity of intellectual powers and their existence as a gift, as a 
lumen given by God at birth. One of his chief sources is Juan 
Huarte de San Juan’s Examen de los ingenios (1575, second 
revised edition in 1594), and like his source, Possevino addresses 
the noetic effects of the Edenic Fall into sin.45 But where Huarte 
	
41  Antonio Possevino, Bibliotheca selecta: qua agitur de 
ratione studiorum, 3 vols (Rome: Typographia Apostolica Vaticana, 1593), I, pp. 
129–42, for a lengthy critique of Bodin’s work. For more, see Michaela Valente, 
“The Works of Bodin under the Lens of Roman Theologians and Inquisitors,” in 
The Reception of Bodin, ed. Howell A. Lloyd (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 219–35, (p. 
226). On Possevino’s frequent use of methodus see Helmut Zedelmaier, 
Bibliotheca Universalis und Bibliotheca Selecta. Das Problem der Ordnung des 
gelehrten Wissens in der frühen Neuzeit (Cologne: Bölhau Verlag, 1992), p. 216 
n. 630. 
42  Possevino explains this order at Bibliotheca selecta, I, pp. 8–
11. See also Antonio Possevino, Cultura ingeniorum (Treviso, 1606), p. 123ff, 
which addresses bibliographical practices as tools for the recovery and 
betterment of knowledge. 
43  For another reading along the same lines, see Zedelmaier, 
Bibliotheca, pp. 191–213, which is a section on “spiritual health through 
method: towards a theory of ingenium”. 
44  Possevino, Bibliotheca, p. 1. 
45  Peter Harrison has explored the significance of this theme 
(though not with respect to Huarte) in The Fall of Man and the Foundations of 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
veers toward determinism, Possevino is more optimistic about 
the malleability of the ingenium. Huarte suggests that each 
person is only really suited for one particular field of activity. As 
Possevino puts it, Huarte admits that those who know how to 
paint or draw have some faculty of thought within them, but he 
denies they have enough of that power for the deep perception 
that characterizes highly abstract disciplines. ‘For this reason 
[Huarte] has no hope that they will ever be philosophers or 
theologians’.46 But Possevino thinks differently: ‘I would say that 
if the concepts [species] that come into thought while writing or 
painting, were not to remain stuck in that path, and the intellect 
was to pour itself into them, there is no reason anyone cannot 
take either [philosophy or theology].47 The Jesuit thus displays 
much more confidence than Huarte in the power of teaching—
method, practices—to shape one’s ingenium as the collection of 
natural inclinations. 
Possevino and Huarte turn to the ingenium for very different 
reasons, which helps us to locate Descartes’s place in the culture 
of ingenuity. Huarte’s goals are broadly civic. Sorting ingenia into 
their best-suited occupations helps society achieve fruitful 
works. Possevino likewise is convinced that there will be ‘fruits’ 
and social benefits to moulding minds according to their 
strengths. But his aims are theological, closely linked to the care 
of souls and their shared responsibilities toward God. The 
Jesuit’s methodical sequence of studies, therefore, is more 
egalitarian and inward, evincing qualities at the heart of the 
Cartesian programme.48 
2 The Ingenium and the Promises of Mathematics 
	
46  Antonio Possevino, Cultura ingeniorum (Treviso, 1606), pp. 
43–44: ‘Nec vero admittit Huartes, qui pingere aut scribere scire, operam dant, 
quibus cum facultas cogitandi insit, negat intelligendi esse vim illam autque 
percipiendo vero sit satis. Quamobrem desperat istos fore umquam 
Philosophos sive Theologos.’ 
47  Possevino, Cultura ingeniorum, p. 44: ‘Dixerim ego, si 
quemadmodum scribendo et pingendos [sic], species, quae in cogitationem 
cadunt, haud in ea sisterent gressum, sed intellectus in eas sese effunderet, nil 
obesse cur utrumque aliquis capere possit.’ 
48  Cf. Descartes, Discours de la méthode, AT IV, p. 1: ‘Common 
sense is the most widely shared thing in the world’ (Le bon sens est la chose du 
monde la mieux partagée). On the relationship of bon sens to esprit and 
ingenium, see Ariew and Garrod in this volume. 
The aspiration of universal method, rules for sorting simple 
notions and assembling them into a chain, leading from 
intuitions to composite wholes, all rooted in a vision of training 
the human ingenium—these elements define the Cartesian 
method as we find it in the Regulae. So far, I have suggested that 
‘methods’ like those of Descartes should be read in a tradition 
that had privileged these aspects of method. Yet in these 
manuals for training the ingenium, mathematics did not hold a 
prominent role, whereas mathematics is central for Descartes. 
After all, most modern observers have found Descartes’s daring 
innovation in his drastic narrowing of a rich substance 
metaphysics into a spare physics of extension, in which 
mathematics offers the paradigm of methodical clarity.49 But in 
the Regulae the role of mathematics is tantalizingly unclear. As 
David Rabouin has shown, there is a disconnect between 
Descartes’s claim of mathematical ease and the difficulty with 
which he performs his own early mathematics, which suggests 
that his choice of mathematics is highly contrived.50 
Furthermore, the mathesis universalis in rule 4 is notoriously 
difficult to strip of its veil: is the method only modelled on 
mathematics by analogy, or does the method comprise the deep 
structure of mathematical reasoning itself?51 I shall suggest that 
Descartes reflects a historically rooted ambivalence about 
mathematics and its role in methods for sharpening ingenia. 
In the genre of rules for study I sketched in the previous 
section, mathematics played a propaedeutic role. Thus 
mathematics supplied exercitationes to strengthen critical 
faculties and help students form judgments. This was a faithful 
version of Plato’s position in the Republic, where he raised the 
possibility that arithmetic and geometry have a certain 
	
49  An art of simple natures (res simplicissimae), as Descartes 
calls it in rule 6 (AT X, pp. 381–3). Cf. Rule 12, AT X, p. 427: ‘all human scientia 
consists in this one thing, so that we should see distinctly in what way those 
simple natures come together all at once in the composition of other things’. 
See also pp. 418–19.  
50  David Rabouin, “What Descartes Knew of Mathematics in 
1628,” Historia Mathematica, 37.3 (2010), pp. 428–59. 
51  See first the classic accounts of Jean-Paul Weber, 
Constitution du texte des “Regulae” (Paris: Société d’Édition d’Enseignement 
Supérieur, 1964), especially pp. 3–17, Jean-Luc Marion, Sur l’ontologie grise de 
Descartes: science cartesienne et savoir aristotélicien dans les “Regulae” (Paris: 
Vrin, 1975), Robinet, Aux sources de l’esprit cartésien, pp. 249–52; Philippe 
Desan, Naissance de la méthode: Machiavel, La Ramée, Bodin, Montaigne, 
Descartes (Paris: A.-G. Nizet, 1987). 
‘commonality’ which makes them suitable for training the 
mind.52 Ultimately, however, Plato found that mathematics only 
enables one to think dialectically; it is not itself the dialectic that 
directly intuits the good. Students met endless retellings of the 
story that Plato had forbidden any without geometry to enter his 
academy, reinforced by references to Book 7 of The Republic. 
The topos seems rather tame from our perspective, but it could 
motivate powerfully. In a few cases, the point was worked up 
into a full-length defence of studies organized on the foundation 
of mathematics, as in the circle of Lefèvre d’Étaples (c. 1455–
1536), who reordered the university curriculum to begin with 
mathematics.53 Giorgio Valla similarly reorganised the entire 
cycle of studies around mathematics in his massive encyclopedia 
De expetendis et fugiendis rebus (1501) (On What to Seek and 
Flee). He justified this arrangement with an account of the soul 
and its powers—in his taxonomy, ‘ingenium is the power of the 
soul which extends and acts toward the understanding of 
unknowns’.54 Drawing on Boethius and the medieval 
Pythagorean tradition, Lefèvre and Valla occasionally seemed to 
award mathematics an ontologically prior position that justified 
mathematics as a kind of universal science.55 Nevertheless, the 
actual effect of their developed statements on pedagogy fit 
within traditional lineaments: mathematics was thought to 
‘sharpen wits’, simply as a propaedeutic to further studies. 
This propaedeutic value became a commonplace. It was a 
central theme in the various apologies for mathematics by 
perhaps the most visible mathematical practitioner of the 
sixteenth century, Oronce Fine.56 The popularizing printer-
	
52  On this ‘commonality’ (κοινωνἰα) see Plato, Republic, 531d. 
53  Preface to Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, Textus de Sphaera 
(Paris, 1495). On this reordering of university studies, see Richard Oosterhoff, 
Making Mathematical Culture: University and Print in the Circle of Lefèvre 
d’Étaples (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
54  Giorgio Valla, De expetendis et fugiendis rebus (Venice, 
1501), a2v: ‘Ingenium est animi vis qua extendit et exercet ad incognitorum 
cognitionem.’ The source is Augustine; see Agostini in this volume. 
55  For medieval hints at a mathematical universal science 
based on Boethius, see David Albertson, Mathematical Theologies: Nicholas of 
Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartres (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
56  Angela Axworthy, Le Mathématicien renaissant et son 
savoir. Le Statut des mathématiques selon Oronce Fine (Paris: Classiques 
Garnier, 2016); Alexander Marr, ed., The Worlds of Oronce Fine: Mathematics, 
Instruments and Print in Renaissance France (Dodington: Shaun Tyas, 2009). 
apothecary of Strasbourg, Hermann Walther Ryff, repeated the 
notion in his collections on mathematical arts.57 The abacus 
master Niccolò Tartaglia reinforced the point by assuring that 
‘gold is tested by fire, and wit by mathematics’ (aurum probatur 
igni, et ingenium mathematicis) on the frontispiece of his Nova 
scientia (1537). In England, Robert Recorde titled his handbook 
to arithmetic The Whetstone of Witte (1557), and the poem 
prefacing his geography manual, The Pathewaie to Knowledge 
(1551), made the propaedeutic promise explicit: 
All freshe fine wittes by me [i.e. geometry] are filed, 
All grosse dull wittes wishe me exiled: 
Though no mannes witte reiect wil I, 
Yet as thei bee, I will them trie. 
The capacity of mathematics to sharpen the ingenium was a 
particular theme among the German professors who made up 
Philipp Melanchthon’s wider network. The Strasbourg professor 
of Greek, Simon Grynaeus had studied mathematics together 
with Melanchthon. In his editio princeps of the Greek Euclid, 
together with Proclus’ commentary, Grynaeus argued that 
geometry in fact is the one means of fixing all the disciplines, 
precisely because it can restore the powers of the mind.58 He 
drew on the ingenium as the source of novelty by presenting the 
New World as a discovery of ingenious cosmographers.59 But the 
most widely read account of mathematics’ propaedeutic power 
was Melanchthon’s own orations on the disciplines, the most 
famous portions of which were dedicated to his old school friend 
Grynaeus. Melanchthon wove together commonplaces on how 
astronomy revealed the powers of the mind, on the simplicity 
and ease of arithmetic, and on how arithmetic prepared the 
	
57  Alexander Marr, “Walther Ryff, Plagiarism and Imitation in 
Sixteenth-Century Germany,” Print Quarterly, 31 (2014), pp. 131–43. 
58  Euclid, Στοικειον βιϐλιον … in Euclidis Geometriae elementa 
Græca. Adiecta præfatiuncula in qua de disciplinis mathematicis nonnihil, ed. 
Simon Grynaeus (Basel, 1533), sig. a4r. Grynaeus discusses the worth of such 
knowledge in practical applications, such as the travel to the New World, and 
cannons—and then shifts from wonder at these machinae to God’s even 
greater marvels in the created world. 
59  Preface to Simon Grynaeus, Novus orbis regionum et 
insularum (Basel, 1532).  
mind best for dialectic.60 In particular, he stressed over and over 
again how God provoked and excited human understanding to 
understand the wondrous natural order; his account of the 
intellectual task depended on a survey of inborn gifts.61 
What is at stake here is precisely the issue that Descartes 
leaves ambiguous: is mathematics a convenient analogy for a 
universal mode of thought? Or—and this is the key alternative—
is mathematics itself the simplest formulation of that mode? Is 
mathematics but one expression of logic, what Plato called 
dialectic, or does logic collapse into mathematics? As we saw in 
the last section, Melanchthon’s student Hemmingsen carefully 
documented how mathematics offered useful models of analysis 
and synthesis for a universal method, but he never reduced 
method to these operations. Descartes’s mention of a mathesis 
universalis is fascinating precisely because it raises the possibility 
of such a unity of method in mathematics. Scholarship on 
Descartes’s sources has unearthed a clutch of late sixteenth-
century authors who reflected on mathematics as such a 
candidate universal science: notably Benito Pereira, Pietro 
Catena, Peter Ramus, Conrad Dasypodius, Adriaan van Roomen, 
and Johann Heinrich Alsted.62 Through these figures, a key 
source for the name as well as the notion of a mathesis 
universalis is the ancient commentary on the first book of Euclid 
by Proclus, who provided a locus classicus for the idea that a 
certain unity or ‘commonality’ underlay both arithmetic and 
geometry—and indeed, ‘all the disciplines’.63 
The reception of Proclus is tangled, and I could not do it or its 
historians justice in rehearsing it here. But a perusal of the 
various sources is already revealing, because of how distant it is 
from the established literature of methods for direction of the 
	
60  Sachiko Kusukawa, ed., Philip Melanchthon: Orations on 
Philosophy and Education, trans. Christine F. Salazar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 105–25. 
61  Philipp Melanchthon, Mathematicarum disciplinarum 
encomia (Strasburg, 1537), A3r. 
62  The first point of call is Giovanni Crapulli, Mathesis 
universalis: Genesi di un’idea nel XVI secolo (Rome: Ataneo, 1969). A useful 
overview of older historiography is found in Chikara Sasaki, Descartes’s 
Mathematical Thought (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 
189–203, but see now David Rabouin, Mathesis universalis: l’idée de 
‘mathématique universelle’ d’Aristote à Descartes (Paris: Épiméthée, 2009). 
63  Glenn R Morrow, Proclus: A Commentary on the First Book 
of Euclid’s Elements (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), prol. 19–20; 
def. 93. 
ingenium. Only very occasionally, and incidentally, do these 
overlap. Perhaps the most obvious but perplexing is Ramus’ view 
that the simplest principles are ultimately mathematical and 
innate to human nature. Ramus used the ingenium in many of 
the same ways that Descartes would do: a certain ‘natural light’ 
capable of intuiting analytical truths. In the first manuscript 
edition of the Dialecticae institutiones (1543), Peter Ramus 
included a section on a ‘mathesis’ as another name for his 
‘natural dialectic’, the gift belonging to the ingenium.64 Ramus 
expanded on this idea after turning his attention to the 
mathematical arts in 1544. In fact, he argued, the innate 
mathesis of the human mind was borne out in the history of 
learning. He obligingly endeavoured to supply the true history, 
surmising a genealogy of mathematics as the oldest of 
intellectual disciplines—and therefore the most fundamental 
form of reasoning.65 In this history, Euclid (and then Proclus after 
him) had obscured this commonsense mathematics with layers 
of commentary. 
Another place where the ingenium and universal mathematics 
meet is in the Italian quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, as 
historians have dubbed the sixteenth-century debate over the 
logical status of mathematics.66 The idea that mathematics is the 
basis for logic is central to one of its protagonists, Pietro Catena 
(1501–1577). In his short Oratio pro idea methodi (1563), Catena 
argues that method is powerful because of its interlinking chain 
of demonstrations, which can be easily enumerated.67 
	
64  This section of MS is edited in Nelly Bruyère, Méthode et 
dialectique, pp. 52–54. 
65  See Robert Goulding, Defending Hypatia: Ramus, Savile, 
and the Renaissance Rediscovery of Mathematical History (New York: Springer, 
2010), pp. 52ff. Euclid (and then Proclus after him) had obscured this natural 
method, Ramus claimed: Peter Ramus, Scholarum mathematicarum, libri unus 
et triginta (Basel, 1569), pp. 76ff. 
66  Besides the useful overview of Antonella Romano in La 
Contre-Réforme mathématique, pp. 153–161, see especially Paolo Mancosu, 
“Aristotelian Logic and Euclidean Mathematics: Seventeenth-Century 
Developments of the Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum,” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science, 23.2 (1992), pp. 241–65. Key sources are 
outlined in Giulio Cesare Giacobbe, “Epigono nel seicento della Quaestio de 
certitudine mathematicarum: Giuseppe Biancani,” Physis, 18.2 (1976), pp. 5–
40; idem, “Un gesuita progressista nella Quaestio de certitudine 
mathematicarum rinascimentale: Benito Pereyra,” Physis, 19, 1–4 (1977), pp. 
51–86. 
67  Petrus Catena, Oratio pro idea methodi (Padua, 1563), fol. 
5v. 
Mathematics, of course, perfectly suits this criterion. Moreover, 
he argues that other methods have failed because they were too 
varied, too obscure and confused: 
It would require a divine rather than human ingenium, 
whether in natural or moral philosophy, to encompass with 
the mind such a great multitude of things, to gather such 
variety into a few kinds, to display such obscure things 
before one’s eyes, and finally to unravel and unfold that 
indiscriminate mass of parts so that the skill of nature is 
shown exactly by unchanged doctrine.68 
The mathematical disciplines supply such a marvellous 
method, he says, because they consider the incorruptible forms 
of things, simply and separately.69 
Both Ramus and Catena supply a revealing set of priorities, 
when they link the ingenium and mathematical method: both 
rely on mathematical objects as incorruptible, innate elements of 
human rationality. But it must be said that Ramus is unusual in 
making the ingenium a central pillar of his account of 
mathematical method; the word emerges somewhat incidentally 
in Catena. Taken as a whole, the debate over mathesis 
universalis was separate from the methodical handbooks 
directing ingenia. One might, for example, expect that the Jesuits 
would explore the possible connection between mathematics 
and method in these terms.70 But (so far as I can tell) this is 
decidedly not the case. Clavius makes strong statements about 
the propaedeutic role of mathematics, but he defends the 
difficulty of his subject instead of passing it off as easy or natural, 
	
68  Here I paraphrase Catena, Oratio, 6v: ‘Divino enim ingenio, 
non humano, esset opus, vel in disciplina naturae, vel in philosophia morum, 
tantam rerum multitudinem animo comprehensam habere, tantam varietatem 
in pauca genera collegere, res tam obscuras ante oculos proponere, postremo 
caecam illam partium con[g]eriem ita evoluere, atque explicare, ut naturae 
artificium imutata doctrina adamussim ostendatur.’ 
69  Catena, Oratio, fol. 6v–7r: ‘quia non considerantur res ex 
corruptibili materia et forma conflatae, sed simplices, ac separatae formae’. 
70  In contrast, those associated with the Quaestio de 
certitudine mathematicarum tend not to use the word ingenium regularly for 
mental faculties, preferring other terms from Aristotelian faculty psychology 
(perhaps because they tend to be more precise). In his translation of Proclus, 
for example, which is full of reflection on the inborn mathematical powers of 
the soul, Barozzi constantly describes instead the vis cogitandi, or the vis 
intelligendi. 
nevermind innate.71 In his Cultura ingeniorum, Possevino gives 
Pythagoras and Plato as his first examples of how one might 
have talent for particular studies.72 Yet when he actually provides 
an introduction to these topics in his grand Bibliotheca, 
Possevino is very clear that mathematics gets its demonstrative 
power from logic, not the other way around.73 
The point is simple. Descartes no doubt was inspired by a late 
sixteenth- 
century debate over a mathesis universalis. But his over 60 uses 
of the word ingenium in the Regulae are hard to explain on that 
basis alone. His powerful innovation lies in grafting approaches 
from this mathematical method onto the broader project of 
directing the ingenium. The uneven fit of these two components 
perhaps goes some way to explaining the ambivalent nature of 
the mathesis universalis that have plagued interpreters of Rule 
IV. 
3 Conclusion 
The ambition to master all knowledge, the limits of one’s 
ingenium, and the challenge of augmenting it—these problems 
set the tenor of intellectual life from fifteenth-century 
pedagogues up to the polyhistors of Enlightenment Germany. 
They fostered a tremendous growth industry of pedagogical 
manuals, diverse in form but united in purpose: handbooks, arts 
of memory, panoptic tables, and above all methods. 
The notion that mathematics was particularly effective at 
shaping wits, that it offered a model for method, and that it was 
simple, brief, and allowed one to order and enumerate mentally 
the simplest components of a domain—these were all topoi 
within the methods handbooks. As I have suggested, the 
connection between ingenium and mathematics is somewhat 
incidental to those authors such as van Roomen and Alsted who 
were preoccupied with a mathesis universalis. I suggest we 
consider how Descartes operated in both traditions: the Regulae 
was not simply a treatise on mathesis universalis, as it is 
	
71  Christopher Clavius, Euclidis Elementorum libri XV (Rome, 
1574), letter to reader. 
72  Possevino, Cultura ingeniorum, pp. 44ff. 
73  Possevino, Bibliotheca selecta, II, pp. 176–77. 
sometimes tempting to read it, but reimagines a broader 
pedagogical discourse around this distinctive topos. 
This was the way at least some seventeenth-century readers 
saw him. Meric Casaubon suspected that Descartes was a 
methodizer, one of the reformers of learning who sought a 
shortcut to all knowledge. Casaubon compared him to Peter 
Ramus, Ramon Lull, and Trithemius, the sort who offered a ‘new 
project, promising new discoveries of a shorter way’.74 Casaubon 
introduces the need, on the one hand, for anyone seeking to 
reform knowledge to have a ‘competent wytt and judgment’, 
while Descartes’s Discours de la méthode revealed him as ‘one, 
whom excessive pride & self conceit … hath absolutely bereaved 
of his witts’.76 He blamed it on Descartes’s social circles, which 
put him up to such a project ‘against his own judgment, at first, 
& undertaken by him rather by way of exercise (to shew his witt, 
or to please some) than [as] a serious taske’.77 Casaubon’s sharp 
reading locates Descartes’ methodical project within a culture of 
ingenuity, both in the older sense of arts or methods to train the 
ingenium, and in the newer sense of salon esprit. 
	
74  Richard Serjeantson, Generall Learning: A Seventeenth-
Century Treatise on the Formation of the General Scholar by Meric Casaubon, 
Renaissance Texts from Manuscript, no. 2 (Cambridge: RTM Publications, 1999), 
p. 146 (MS p. 21). 
76  Generall Learning … by Casaubon, p. 146 and 148. 
77  Generall Learning … by Casaubon, p. 150. 
